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Abstract: The objective of this report is to examine the public external debt sustainability 
of Mongolia, and to propose appropriate regulatory actions for ongoing debates about 
economic reform. Following sharp external shocks that include a drop in foreign direct 
investment and a depreciation of the national currency, the country is at a critical moment 
of determining whether to default on its external debts or correct structural policy failures. 
Therefore, it is important that Mongolia identify its level of debt distress and determine 
which structural reforms should take place.
This report examines the external public debt sustainability of Mongolia using the Debt 
Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries (DSFLC) [32], the methodology 
presented jointly by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in 2005.
This method of debt sustainability assessment is conducted based on current and future 
debt burden indicators under baseline and alternative scenarios, stress tests, and 
vulnerability to exogenous shocks. This analysis enables us to determine a country’s 
appropriate strategy for borrowing and appropriate policy responses. It should be noted 
that the analysis is limited to external public and publicly-guaranteed debts only. The 
analysis includes a discussion of dual policy measures consisting of privatization and 
financial market liberalization.
Debt sustainability analysis (DSA) has not been performed for Mongolia since March,
2015; despite the fact that it is supposed to be updated annually for each member country 
by the IMF according to its Article IV consultation report. The March 15 report concluded 
that the country faced a high risk of debt distress, and that its debt dynamics exhibit a 
high vulnerability to external shocks. It also suggested some appropriate policy measures 
addressing the possible debt distress [34], Even though the report emphasized upcoming 
distress and counteractions, the debt situation has worsened to this date according to a 
statement in August 2016 by Mongolia’s Finance Minister, Choijilsuren Battogtokh. He 
eventually confirmed that the country is in the midst of economic crisis. Therefore, this
paper emphasizes the importance of identifying Mongolias level of external debt distress 
using standardized methodology.
This paper presents the following topics: 1) a literature review on external debt 
sustainability; 2) a discussion of the method of debt sustainability analysis; 3) an overview 
of Mongolia’s current macroeconomic situation; 4) the existing external debt level, its 
management, and policy; 5) an assessment of debt sustainability under alternative 
scenarios, stress tests, and vulnerability to exogenous shocks; 6) selected policy 
recommendations; 7) conclusion.
1 Literature review
Active interest in determining what would constitute a sustainable level of external public 
debt has received longstanding interest. Concern exists given that, although certain levels 
of indebtedness could promote economic growth, at some point an increase in public debt 
could not only harm economic growth, but also spark a full-blown debt crisis [10].
Governments constantly face borrowing constraints measured against the amount of 
surplus they can accumulate in the future. Thus, they must intertemporally balance their 
budgets by maintaining a present value of debt equal to a discounted sum of expected 
future surpluses [24],However, as increasing levels of debt service become harder to finance, 
they can lead to further economic distress because the value of debt increases much faster 
than the growth of the economy [12]. The literature argues that increased external debt 
beyond a sustainable level causes an increase in a countrys risk premium, which results in a 
continuous increase in the value of debt service [10].
Several reasons are deemed to cause a rise in debt to an unsustainable level. Traditionally, 
these include war financing and maintaining consumption through business cycles [16].
Also, overconfidence in future tax revenues as well as political impatience leading to
funding infrastructure or social benefit programs that could eventually result in increased 
debt levels. Moreover, increasing financial liberalization of financial markets has made 
lending and borrowing transactions much easier and more liquid [16]. Reinhart et al.
(2011) argue that a banking crisis often triggers a sovereign debt crisis [23].
Yet the question of the optimal level of indebtedness for an economy is still controversial. 
According to Cottarelli et al. [13], the appropriate level of debt is different for every 
economy given that vulnerabilities of debt are not homogenous across countries. Reinhart 
et al. [24] argue that real GDP growth starts to decline at an external debt-to-GDP ratio 
of 60 percent in both advanced and emerging economies. Also, Pattillo et ah, [21] find that 
the contribution of foreign debt to growth becomes negative at a point between 35 to 40 
percent of GDP.
The World Bank and IMF categorize countries into different external debt thresholds 
depending on the quality of their institutions and policy-making capacities [33]. According 
to this standard, the external debt-to-GDP ratio benchmarks for the countries that have 
weak, medium, and strong capacity are 30, 40 and 50 percent, respectively.
2 The Methodology of Debt Sustainability Analysis
Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA) is a standard methodology developed jointly by the 
IMF and World Bank for assessing debt stress levels in low-income countries. The DSA 
framework mainly emphasizes the risk factors of solvency risk and liquidity risk by 
calculating a countys present value of income stream against its expenditures and existing 
debts.
The framework has two components: external debt and public debt. The foreign debt 
section covers total external debt in the economy by both the public and private sectors. 
Government debt is limited to foreign debt owed and guaranteed by the government. The
DSA does not include private domestic debt.
DSA considers the major debt stock indicators of present value (PV) and grant element 
(GE). The PV of debt is the discounted sum of all future debt services using a discount 
rate. The analysis uses a uniform discount rate of 5 percent according to a decision by the 
Executive Boards of the World Bank and IMF since 2013. A grant element (GE) is an 
indicator of the concessionality of debt, which is the ratio of the difference between the 
nominal and present value to nominal value. The higher the grant element is, the higher 
probability that the loan is provided with concessionality.
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In order to examine solvency and liquidity positions, the framework employs a series of 
debt burden indicators, including the present value of public debt to GDP, exports, and 
fiscal revenue; and public debt service to exports and budget revenue. The Funds set the 
thresholds for each of the indicators based on a Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) index.
According to the framework, the benchmark for public debt to GDP level is advised as 
shown in Table 1.
Moreover, the DSA is conducted based on a baseline scenario and stress tests. The baseline 
scenario shows the most probable projection of a country’s debt without any significant 
policy changes or exogenous shocks. It is estimated based on projections of main 
macroeconomic variables. The stress tests represent the sensitivity of the baseline scenario
Q u ality  o f  policies and
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in percent o f
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in percent o f
institutions C P I A G D P E x p o rts R evenue E x p o rts R evenue
Weak 30 100 200 15 18
Medium 40 150 250 20 20
Strong 50 200 300 25 22
Source: [33]
to the shocks mentioned above and macroeconomic assumption changes in the baseline 
scenario variables.
The methodology provides two standardized stress tests, namely, alternative scenarios and 
bound tests. Alternative scenarios allow researchers to modify macroeconomic assumptions 
used in the baseline scenario. Bound tests are subject to short-term shocks to the 
variables, which eventually reset to the baseline assumption.
Several different alternative scenarios can be conducted. First, key variables are modified 
to the historical average. Second, the primary balance-to-GDP ratio remains unchanged 
from the projection period. Third, long-term growth deteriorates. Furthermore, we can 
employ bound tests based on shocks of real output, primary balance, combined one 
standard deviation, real exchange rate depreciation, and contingent liability.
Finally, an overall assessment provides the general picture of the overall risk of debt 
distress in the economy. The methodology classifies countries as having a low, moderate, or 
high external risk rating and debt distress.
3 Current macroeconomic situation
According to a statement by Mongolias Finance Minister in August 2016, Mongolia, a 
country once dubbed as the fifth Asian tiger, is now in a deep state of economic crisis.
Only five years ago, Mongolia’s 17.5 percent growth rate, abundant mineral resources, and 
strategically desirable location next to China made it one of the prospering emerging 
markets in the world. Yet today Mongolia faces a real risk of debt default and a severe 
crisis rooted in economic mismanagement and populism.
As shown in Figure 1, , the country’s economic growth rate has plummeted dramatically 
over the last three years. In 2016, the economy grew by only 0.01%, and since July 2016 
deflation followed the economic downturn. Moreover, Figure 2 shows that, compared to a 
surplus present in 2010, in 2016 the country had a budget deficit that reached nearly 16%, 
largely due to extravagant expenditure increases in social welfare programs, pensions, 
housing services, and government salaries. The only way to finance the resulting large 
budget imbalance was borrowing. Since 2012, the Mongolian government has raised 4.7 
billion US dollars as external securities. This amounts to nearly half of GDP, of which, 
around $2.6 billion of external debt service is scheduled to come due in the next three 
years, which is equal to two-thirds of total government revenue each particular year [31].
Figure 1: Real GDP growth Figure 2: Fiscal Situation
Meanwhile, the recent drop in mining commodity prices and foreign direct investments has 
triggered a sharp decline in currency inflow to the economy. Figure 3 shows that in 2016 
foreign direct investment decreased by a monthly average of 0.9 percent, and by 94 percent 
compared to 2012. Also, Figure 4 shows that the economy experienced a continuous 
contraction in its balance of payments since 2012.
Figure 3: Foreign Direct Investment Figure 4: Current and Capital Accounts
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By the end of 2016, the national currency depreciated against the US dollar by 25 percent 
year-on-year, which has deteriorated the external debt condition immensely. Following the 
sharp drop in investment and a balance of payment deficit, the Central Bank of Mongolia 
regularly intervened using its foreign exchange reserves in an effort to stabilize the strong 
depreciation of the Mongolian currency since 2013. Figure 5 illustrates that Mongolia’s 
foreign reserves have declined by 68 percent since January 2013 and has no further capacity 
to assuage ongoing depreciation. As a result, the Central Bank increased its policy rate 
sharply by 450 basis points in August 2016. As the situation is becoming more dire, the 
country’s capacity to sustain its debt condition is continuously deteriorating.
Figure 5: FX Reserve and Exchange Rate Figure 6: External Trade
Export volume had increased until the end of 2014 due to currency depreciation. However, 
since 2015 temporary growth has been negative due to the sharp decline in mining 
commodity prices in the global market. By the end of 2016, an upward trend in mineral
prices severs as a positive sign for the economy. It should be noted that copper, gold, coal 
and iron ore make up 85% of Mongolian exports. A steady contraction of exports caused 
further deterioration in the currency rate, government revenue, and the capacity to service 
external debt until the end of 2016.
4 Mongolia’s debt situation
The Mongolia’s latest Debt Sustainability Analysis prepared jointly by IMF and World 
Bank staff in March 2015 concludes that Mongolia suffers from the high risk of external 
public debt distress [34]. The key debt indicators had exceeded the appropriate thresholds 
since 2013. Moreover, the report states that the debt indicators are highly susceptible to 
various standard shocks including sharp exchange rate depreciation and decline of the 
balance of payment inflows. More importantly, the debt risks call for immediate policy 
actions as the baseline scenario were not sufficient to safeguard macro-financial stability 
and to ensure debt sustainability [34].
Figure 7: External Debt Figure 8: External Debt Ratios
Figure 7 and Figure 8 show that the expected debt service from 2017 to 2019 would pose 
massive pressure in the economy. Declining economic growth, contracting balance of 
payment, and deteriorating government revenue would make fiscal situation insufficient to 
finance the remaining debt service, all of which are denominated in foreign currency.
Therefore, we may assume that there is a high probability of an external debt default in 
2018 unless the government raises additional borrowings to refinance the existing debt 
repayments. However, a marginal cost of capital of this massive amount of borrowings 
would be at least 12%, which is likely to drag the country into a further debt spiral, due to 
the continuous decline in Mongolia’s sovereign credit ratings and current economic 
condition. It is evident that new Eurobonds would be costlier than the previous bond with 
10.875% annual coupon rates issued in April 2016.
Moreover, it should be considered the external concessional loan and commercial securities 
separately. First, the massive amount of external bonds maturing in upcoming few years 
may cause the biggest problem of debt distress. It can be seen in Table 2 that Mongolia is 
facing the principal payment of $660 million in 2018. Together with the interest payment, 
the total repayments would cost nearly 46% of total government revenue, which the 
government cannot finance from the existing resource.
Table 2: Government External Securities
N o. Issuer A m ount C oupon Issued M aturity
1. Government of Mongolia 500M USD 4.125% 12/5/2012 2017
2. Government of Mongolia 1,000M USD 5.125% 12/5/2012 2022
3. Development Bank of Mongolia 161.2M USD 5.960% 6/30/2015 2018
4. Government of Mongolia 500M USD 10.875% 4 /6 /2016 2021
Source: Ministry of Finance of Mongolia
Table 3: Government Guaranteed Debt
N o. Issuer A m ou n t C oupon Issued M aturity
1. MIAT Mongolian Airlines 77.5M USD 2.520% 12/24/2013 2023
2. MIAT Mongolian Airlines 24M USD 5.300%+LIBOR 12/24/2013 2020
3. MIAT Mongolian Airlines 20M USD 9.380%+LIBOR 12/24/2013 2018
4. Development Bank of Mongolia 30B JPY 1.520% 1/6/2014 2024
5. Development Bank of Mongolia 162M USD 6.000% 9/3/2014 2022
6. Development Bank of Mongolia 300M USD 4.250%+LIBOR 9/5/2014 2019
7. Trade & Development Bank of Mongolia 500M USD 9.375% 5/19/2015 2020
8. Erdenes Mongol LLC 35M USD LIBOR 4/1/2016 2031
Source: Ministry of Finance of Mongolia
Second, the well-diversified portfolio of external concessional loans lowers the credit and 
liquidity risk. However, the net present value of the external loan reaches $2.3 billion, 
which is 10% of total GDP; the different maturities of total 197 dilferent loan agreements 
will not have any repayment pressure in any single year till 2050. It can be seen in Figure 9 
and Figure 10 that the major creditors are Asian Development Bank, Japanese 
International Cooperation Agency, and World Bank, which provide development loans with 
substantially more generous than the commercial securities.
Figure 9: External loan by creditors Figure 10: External loan by currencies
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Figure 11: Maturity Schedule of External 
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Therefore, based on the current situation, it can be assumed that Mongolia is likely to 
confront the debt default if the country does not take any decisive policy actions or make 
new securities to refinance existing external securities. Although, given the debt distress, it 
would be much costly to raise new Eurobonds in the external market. The required rate of
return from investors would be much higher than the previous bond, which had 10.875% 
coupon with five years maturity denominated in US dollars. Moreover, the continuously 
declining sovereign credit ratings would make additional borrowings much costlier than 
before.
Table 4: Sovereign credit ratings of Mongolia
Rating agency Dec 2016 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011
S&P B- B- B B + BB- BB- BB-
Moody’s Caal B3 B2 B2 B1 B1 B1
Fitch B- B B B + B + B + B +
Source: S&P Financial Services LLC, M oody’s Investors Service, and Fitch Ratings Inc
The sovereign credit ratings for Mongolia have continuously downgraded since 2014. 
Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings Inc., announced to reduce Mongolia’s 
government bond rating to Caal from B3 and to B- from B, respectively, in November 
2016. The corresponding press release on 8 December 2016 concludes that the Mongolian 
fiscal strength and the economy’s external position have deteriorated significantly. The 
capability to finance its external debt service to multilateral and bilateral borrowings is 
uncertain. Moreover, it states that the failure of debt repayment would increase the risks of 
a balance of payments crisis.
From the institutional framework perspective, the Parliament of Mongolia enacted the Law 
on Fiscal Stability in 2010 to ensuring fiscal stability and special fiscal requirements 
including debt ceilings. Initially, the net present value of government debt including any 
securities guaranteed by the government shall not exceed 40% of nominal GDP of the 
particular year excluding any public borrowings for the purpose of contributing into 
paid-in-capital of a foreign invested mining companies. However, the authorities have 
continuously altered the debt threshold and its calculation method. First, the amendment 
to the Fiscal Stability Law in January 2015 changed the debt target to 58.3% in 2015, 55% 
in 2016, 50% in 2017 and 40% after that. Second, another amendment was enacted to
increase the debt ceiling to 88% in 2016, 85% in 2017, 80% in 2018 and the general 
threshold to 60% from 40%. Moreover, the subsequent changes to the law narrowed the 
definition of government debt by excluding government guarantees that secured any 
borrowings and state-owned enterprises’ loans on energy, railroad, mining industries. These 
law amendments provided additional room for the government to issue more guarantees. 
Also, the external borrowings of the Development Bank of Mongolia, a 100% state-owned 
development bank, had been excluded from the calculation of government debt level.
In February 2015, the Parliament enacted the Debt Management Law to set out a 
comprehensive institutional framework that facilitates the regulations, implementations 
and monitoring the government debt related issues. The law provided a broader definition 
of state total external debt, which is quite similar to the IMF’s definition: ’’ Payment 
obligations of the government, local community, Bank of Mongolia, and entities registered 
in Mongolia to all unregistered non-residents.” However, the government debt definition 
remains unchanged by excluding government guarantees as per the Fiscal Stability Law. 
Furthermore, the Parliament approves the Government’s Medium-term Debt Management 
Strategy in every three years. The law regulates all debt related issues and procedures 
including state and local government debt issues, government guarantee procedures and 
duties and responsibilities of authorities; however, the main challenge for excessive external 
public debt remains vulnerable due to altered calculation of debt NPV and unconventional 
exclusion of borrowings to specific industries.
5 Empirical results
In general, we can conclude that Mongolia’s debt dynamics have deteriorated since the last 
DSA report and still in a high risk of debt distress based on the assessment. Due to a 
sharp depreciation of the national currency, the external debts denominated in US dollars
soared significantly. The external public and publicly guaranteed debt reached 61.1% of 
GDP. It is projected to exceed 125% of GDP from 2017 due to the refinancing of existing 
debts and stay above the benchmark for almost the entire projection horizon. Also, if the 
economic condition and credit rating negative outlooks continue as the baseline scenario, 
the level debt-to-GDP ratio is likely to increase more. As shown in Figure 13, the 
Mongolia’s external public debt to GDP ratio is relatively higher than most of the debt 
defaulted countries. Moreover, the debt service indicators including debt service-to-exports 
and debt service-to-revenue breach the threshold level significantly till 2022, when 1 billion 
US dollars bonds mature.
Figure 13: Debt-to-GDP ratios of External Debt Defaulted Countries
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Under the baseline scenario, we predict the GDP growth would be less than 1% percent 
until 2018 as shown in Figure 14, when the massive debt services are due. However, the 
longer-term growth will stay around 8% given the promising prospects of the mining sector 
and fiscal discipline. The public debt to GDP ratio will be 130%, in average. Mongolia’s all 
external debt indicators breach the thresholds and remain above them during the projected 
period.
We conduct the debt sustainability by using alternative scenarios and bound tests as follows 
1. Alternative scenarios
A l. Key variables at their historical averages in 2017-2037
A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2017-2037 
2. Bound tests
Bl. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation 
B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation 
B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation 
B4. Net non-debt creating flows at historical average minus one standard deviation 
B5. Combination of B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks 
B6. One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2018 
The debt dynamics show a high vulnerability to shocks and bound tests. The debt 
indicators are highly sensitive to GDP deflator shock and sharp exchange rate depreciation. 
Given one standard deviation in GDP deflator, the present value of external public debt 
would peak at 147% of GDP from 129% in 2018. Also, if one-time 30 percent nominal 
depreciation occurs in 2018, the present value will increase by 57% of GDP. The bound test 
results exhibit the macro-financial stability highly susceptible to the fluctuation and 
balance of payments flow.
For our estimation, we assume that Mongolia would not take any additional commercial 
debt from the external market. If so, the required yield would be much higher than 
10.875% of the previous bond that would push the country into the much harder debt 
spiral, and the probability of default becomes clear. Instead of that, the government should
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actively seek external loans from donor organizations with the concessional term.
6 Selected Policy Recommendations
Mongolia’s long-term economic prospects remain promising with high literate and educated 
young population, the sheer size of mineral wealth remained to be materialized in the 
future; however, in the short run, our empirical study shows that the economy faces serious 
challenges such as additional borrowing needs for debt service. The pressure of debt cycle 
is expected to deteriorate the balance of payment further. Meanwhile, the budget deficit 
remains high as it lacks fiscal stability against possible external shocks including mineral 
price volatility and downturn of the Chinese economy. Therefore, the country needs 
structural economic reforms including public finance and financial sector.
In this section, we examine the selected two areas of structural reform in addition to the 
debt management. First, based on you empirical results, we propose policy 
recommendations for debt management issues. Second, the regulation of potential financial 
sector liberalization is discussed. Second, we analyze how the situation of state-owned 
enterprises would become favorable both to society and the government.
These topics are selected due to the importance of existing system and current debates
under the spotlight among variety of societal groups. For each topic, first, we discuss 
existing literature. Second, the current situation of Mongolia is provided. Third, we 
propose policy recommendations addressing the problems of the selected topics.
6.1 Debt Management
Given the risks mentioned in our study, the immediate policy actions should be taken. 
First, the budget deficit shall be tightened. The lax; fiscal expenditure, social benefit, and 
cash handouts to some target groups including students and children below an 18 years old 
should be decreased. Also, avoidance of an increase in monetary base and domestic bond 
issuance would be critical to lessen the debt distress impact on the economy.
Second, the definition of external government debt should be revised in order to determine 
the net present value and subsequent ratios accurately. Currently, external publicly 
guaranteed debt on energy, mining, and railroad sector are excluded from the NPV 
calculations of external public debt by the subsequent changes to the law. These changes 
enable the government to raise excessive foreign debt which led the current distressed 
situation.
Third, the government needs to focus more on raising concessional loans from donor 
organizations, specifically those who have standard programs to troubled economies. The 
standard programs conducted by IMF would be an ideal alternative. The benefit of 
Stand-By or Extended Fund Facility arrangements would be not only additional financial 
resource but also gives a positive signal to the global investors due to its strong terms and 
conditions.
Fourth, it is of importance to encourage export and current account inflow at this time. 
The government needs to resolve the issues that triggered the poor investment inflow 
including frequent changes to investment-related laws and tax laws, which created legal
uncertainty. A possible resolution can be loosening the requirements for investment 
agreements and tax stabilization certificates. The tax laws can be changed to encourage 
export-oriented projects and foreign direct investments. For example, the universal 20% of 
withholding tax for non-residents income can be reduced to 10%, the level of existing tax 
treaties.
6.2 Liberalization of Financial Sector
Mongolia has never opened its banking sector door to foreign financial institutions. It has 
always been controversial whether the country should open its financial market to 
foreigners. The current structure of financial markets provides nothing but higher interest 
rates and constraint of access to lending. Domestic banks are criticized for their high 
lending rate, nepotism, and related party transactions. In fact, excessive lending practices 
caused several banking failures in the past. Therefore, the major expectation from foreign 
banks is that they would decrease the overall interest rates and provide long-term financing.
In this section, first, we discuss litarature on the implications of foreign bank operation to 
a host country, and legal environment of Mongolia towards foreign banks. Second, we 
propose three regulatory actions that are necessary before permitting any foreign banks.
There are two ways for a country to liberalize its financial market to foreigners. First, 
foreign direct investment in the banking sector can be permitted, which has already taken 
place in equities of major Mongolian banks. Second, the country can allow cross-border 
banking activities through their branch or permanent establishment in the host country. 
This paper is limited to discuss on the latter way of liberalization in the context of 
Mongolia.
According to literature, the conventional benefits of foreign bank penetration include 
efficiency gains by new technologies, imported know-how, management techniques and
more efficient products as well as greater competition stimulated by new firms [1] [8] [9]. 
These positive gains are of utmost important to Mongolia’s underdeveloped financial 
market and the main arguments of the proponents of allowing foreign bank entries.
However, there are some shortcomings on foreign bank entrance to an emerging market. 
First, foreign banks are more prone to have ’’ cut and run” behavior when their 
performance does not meet the expectation [8]. As a result, the host economy would suffer 
from this sudden pullout of capital. Second, due to lack of information availability of 
smaller lenders, foreign banks are likely to end up crediting to larger and more transparent 
firms, which pushes local banks to deal with more informationally opaque and smaller 
customers [14]. Third, the foreign banks may engage in regulatory arbitrage seizing gaps in 
regulations among countries [8]. The Central Bank of Mongolia may face difficulties in 
conducting effective monitoring and coordination among parents, sandwich companies, and 
their subsidiaries.
Having said that, Mongolia would face some obstacles, if it opens the market to foreign 
banks. First, the higher reserve requirements and tightened prudential ratios may increase 
the cost of capital of foreign firms that pressures down the ability to provide longer-term 
loans with lower interest rates. Second, the public expectation of lowering interest rates 
cannot be achieved only by allowing foreign bank operation. The interest rates remain high 
not only because of the banks but also by many macroeconomic reasons including the 
country risk, high expected inflation, weak financial market. A probable negative outcome 
might be a deterioration in the competitiveness of domestic banks due to their higher cost 
of capital.
Regarding the existing legislations, Mongolia does not have any specific regulations for 
income-generating activities of foreign banks. Under Banking Law of Mongolia, it is 
prohibited for foreign banks to operate via their branches or subsidiaries in Mongolia 
without a license issued by the Central Bank. However, it is possible to open a
representative office without performing any banking operations. ’’ The Regulation on Bank 
Licensing” adopted by the Central Bank of in June 2012 specifies the requirements for 
establishing a foreign bank representative office. Foreign banks may establish local 
subsidiaries not earlier than one year after the establishment of their Mongolian 
representative offices. The foundation of a representative office is a prerequisite for the 
establishment of a local subsidiary. The minimum equity capital requirement for a 
Mongolian subsidiary of a foreign bank is approximately $50 million, which is much higher 
than $12 million from a domestic bank. Currently, there are five foreign banks have been 
operating in Mongolian financial market since 2008 through their representative offices.
There is an additional legal requirement prevails to foreign state-owned banks. The 
Investment Law of Mongolia states that any firm dealing business in banking sector owned 
by more than 33% of the total shares by owned foreign government shall get permission by 
the Government of Mongolia. The Bank of China, one of the potential license seekers, has 
its 67.7% of total shares held by the state-owned corporation ’’ Central Huijin Investment 
Ltd.,” . Thus, this bank would need to seek an addition permission from the Government. 
Moreover, an entry of any Chinese state-owned bank may result in an increased imbalance 
that conflicts with the National Security Concept of Mongolia. The concept was enacted in 
2010 by the Parliament proclaims the Balanced Investment Strategy that designs whereby 
the investment of any foreign country does not exceed one-third of overall foreign 
investment in Mongolia. Moreover, the strategy restricts investments by foreign-owned 
companies and balance the volume of investment by neighboring and highly developed 
countries within the strategically important sector.
Our policy recommendation presents three regulatory actions. First, we discuss ex-ante 
actions including authorization and preparation processes. Second, we examine ex-post 
issues such as supervisions and operational boundaries. Third, we consider the existing 
double tax treaties’ provisions related to financial business. For every phase of engaging
Table 5: Foreign Banks having a representative office in Mongolia
N o N a m e  o f foreign banks D a te  o f  establish m ent
1 ING Bank N.V Aug 2008
2 Standard Chartered Bank Jul 2012
3 Bank of China Dec 2012
4 Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Jul 2013
5 Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ Dec 2013
Source: [5]
foreign financial institutions, the cooperation with supervisory authorities of the countries 
where parent company incorporates is of utmost importance. The mutual understanding, 
information exchange, and reciprocal supervising obligations with parent countries are the 
biggest challenges for developing countries to engage with large foreign banks. However, 
there is no worldwide agreement on procedures relating to authorization and supervision of 
new foreign banks in other nations; we mostly refer the principles and guidelines set out by 
Basel Committee and Bank for International Settlements [2] [3] in this section.
First, in terms of ex-ante actions, Mongolia should update the existing law and regulations 
by focusing more on foreign bank activities. First, the country should set up legally defined 
rules that require cooperating agreements with supervisory authorities of the countries, in 
which parent institutions are established. It is crucial to have active contacts and mutual 
understandings with the parent authorities as a basis for further cooperative supervision. 
By doing so, Mongolia shall require a confirmation of parent authorities ensuring that the 
new establishments will be subject to the consolidated oversight of the parent banks, and 
relevant information about the activities of such foreign establishments will be available to 
Mongolian authorities. This confirmation can be requested by either the requested bank or 
directly from the parent authorities.
Furthermore, there are some additional circumstances [3] in where Mongolia should not 
give permission to entry or, at least, shall conduct a more meticulous examination. First,
in any case, Mongolia should not allow foreign banks from a country where supervisory 
arrangements do not exist, or inadequate, or granted a specific exemption from supervision 
by its parent authority. Second, the parent bank has to be authorized as a bank in its 
country and subject to the oversight by its parent authorities. Third, Mongolia should 
ensure that all activities of parent institution are subject to the oversight in their countries 
on a worldwide consolidated basis. Fourth, as a part of authorization procedure, it is 
important to identify the beneficial ownership of the parent company instead of 
intermediate ’’ sandwich” institution.
Second, from the ex-post regulatory perspective, one of the biggest challenges for 
developing countries to engage with foreign banks is the supervision capacity for 
cross-border activities. The risk of escaping regulators’ sights by using complex types of 
corporate and financial structures across international borders is not only a problem for 
developing countries but also even for the most developed economies. It is rigorous and 
costly to supervise banking institutions across borders.
Followings are the must-consider ex-post rules [2] to be set out into Mongolia’s existing 
legislations towards foreign banks. First, it is essential to classify the foreign establishment 
as a bank by both host and parent authorities for further examination. There should not 
be any major definition gap between the countries. Second, Mongolia shall set up a specific 
rule that enables its authority accessing to information of the parent company or overall 
structure of banking group and conduct of business related to such establishments. Third, 
in order to avoid transfer pricing, the Mongolian authorities should have a right to 
exchange information with the parent’s regulators of non-banking activities with financial 
characters, if necessary.
Since the supervising responsibilities of host and parent authorities are complementary and 
overlapping, the consolidated and comprehensive supervision is must be taken to monitor 
the risk exposure of banks, solvency, liquidity, capital adequacy, and foreign exchange
positions by the overall structure of the bank’s business. Mongolia should have an 
approach of supervising subsidiaries as an independent bank; even though, they have access 
to reinforcements of their parent companies in the event of distress.
Furthermore, it is of importance to set rules against foreign banks to pick the most 
profitable customers selectively. It is unfavorable to Mongolia if foreign owned banks are 
less inclined to provide credit to smaller firms [4] [25]. This cherry-picking practices will 
weaken the domestic banks and further deteriorate the overall access to lending. Therefore, 
it is probable to set minimum ratio on the composition of foreign banks’ asset portfolio to 
encourage their financing to the retail markets. Meanwhile, the greater penetration of 
foreign banks is likely to increase financing from domestic banks to small and medium 
enterprises because of increased competition in the market [20].
Finally, the existing double tax treaties should not have loophole among each other and 
with the domestic legislations. Foreign bank subsidiaries are subject to business 
withholding taxes, mainly on dividend and interest payments to outside. Most of the 
treaty counterparts of Mongolia provide the tax credit for already paid tax in Mongolia to 
reduce the potential double taxation as per OECD model treaty. However, several existing 
treaties have a lower withholding tax rates than that of domestic tax rates [30]. It is not a 
question of whether the tax is high or low. Tax jurisdictions should not have unfavorable 
treatment for local banks rather than foreign bank subsidiaries. For example, the dividend 
withholding tax is 20% in domestic law, while 5% of this tax rate applies to Chinese, South 
Korean subsidiaries according to the treaty. Also, the 20% of domestic withholding tax on 
interest payment is set as 0% for Belgian, French, Swiss, 5% for Singaporean, 7% for 
British subsidiaries [30]. Therefore, Mongolian authority should re-consider this 
differentiated withholding tax rates among the treaties and domestic laws.
6.3 Depoliticization of State-owned Enterprises
Inefficiency in state-owned enterprises has been an epicenter of political debates in 
Mongolia since 1990. It is not controversial that public enterprises tend to employ 
excessively, produce goods that market does not need, accumulate overly debts, not update 
their capital stock, create losses and so on.
Theoretically, enterprises should be owned by governments to remedy monopoly and 
externality problems. However, the main reason of inefficiency in state-owned enterprises is 
political pressures by which politicians attain their political agenda over public enterprises 
[6]. In order to get votes or avoid riots, politicians have an interest to encourage excess 
employment, transfer pricing, unnecessary procurements, location in economically 
inefficient places, and underpricing of output rather than efficiency. It is common that 
politicians subsidize state-owned enterprises in order to convince them to pursue their 
political goals [26]. In return, executives hire extra employees or procure politicians related 
goods and services. This bargaining between politicians and managers over firm’s 
operation results in soft budget constraints in return for the desired inefficiency.
Moreover, publicly-owned enterprises are less efficient than private-owned because their 
managers are strongly protected from the market for corporate control. Most of the 
publicly-owned company managers are appointed by politicians. Thus, they are not forced 
to keep up earnings due to the lack of corporate takeovers [7].
Therefore, depoliticization is necessary for those public enterprises engaging with political 
agenda or inefficient operation. There are several ways to get rid of political pressure from 
public companies. First, privatization can be a feasible solution of restructuring entities. 
Giving more or full autonomy for private ownerships may incentivize managers to 
maximize profits and seek efficiency. Also, by cutting out the political chain, firms might 
increase their efficiency due to market competition or hard budget constraint [28]. Second, 
corporatization may empower firm executives to extract more efficiency in the bargain with
politicians by shifting control from politicians to managers [26]. This approach for 
restructuring public entities increases the cost to politicians for exerting their influence 
over firms to cater their wishes.
Beyond the changing ownership structure of public enterprises, there are three more 
strategies of depoliticization: competition policy, equity governance, and capital allocation. 
First, fostering market competition by deregulation would challenge public state-owned 
entities [26]. By facing competitors in more liberal markets, the public enterprises would 
have no choice but to increase their efficiency or seek more subsidies. If they get more 
subsidies, feeding up inefficient firms in a competitive market will increase the fiscal burden 
to the government. The resulting debt increase is costly to politicians to get votes. This 
stipulates the political behavior that restricts market competition to exert their influence 
more.
Another central depoliticization mechanism is the transfer of equity ownership from state 
to activist investors [26]. The activists are known as they constantly put hard pressure on 
managers to increase the firm’s efficiency. Third, it is possible to limit or replace political 
allocation of capital with private allocation. If there is a credit line from state-owned banks 
or budget, the politically influenced firms would have advantages to get loans and subsidies.
Mongolian public enterprises have been blamed for their inefficiency, high level of subsidies 
and debts, and excessive procurement since the mass privatization in early 90s. Therefore, 
due to the public demand of getting rid of those entities, politicians keep promising to 
privatize them in order to get more votes. It has always been an inseparable part of every 
political election debates. After the elections, privatization fever always become abated.
There are currently 87 wholly or partly state-owned companies operating in Mongolia. 
Some industries in the economy are fully owned by the state including energy, electricity, 
their grid systems, road maintenance, stock exchange, clearinghouse, airport and railroad. 
While, some state-owned enterprises operate in competitive market such as banking,
tourism, construction, agriculture and mining. Also,
The Government officials reportedly announce the high level of indebtedness and loss of 
public entities. According to the Mongolian Government Agency for Policy Coordination of 
State Property, the number of state-owned entities with loss is gradually increasing, while 
the number of profitable public enterprises has decreased as shown in Table 6
Table 6: Profits and losses of Mongolia’s Public Entities
N um ber of companies 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
With profit 45 45 an 37 51 39
Amount of profit (in bln LCU) 325.7 258.9 206.8 49.6 74.7
With loss 22 27 41 33 44
Amount of loss (in bln LCU) -32.2 -53.7 -171.8 -159.3 -90.7
Source: Mongolian Government Agency for Policy Coordination of State Property
The privatization is generally perceived by the general population as an example of decisive 
economic reform that can explicitly benefit them [26]. During annual budget discussions in 
Mongolia, privatization of several public enterprises becomes one of the most controversial 
issues. Every year, Government proposes to raise revenue by privatizing state-owned 
companies and to allocate extra expenditure from this revenue source. As a result, the 
privatization becomes a political phenomenon rather than economic restructuring action. 
Nowadays, politicians use this terminology to gain more support and votes. In 2017 State 
Budget, six large firms are announced to be privatized including state-owned commercial 
bank, stock exchange, telecommunication and postal service. However, there is no sign to 
take these actions into place.
Therefore, we propose four policy actions that can effectively address the current 
drawbacks of public enterprises. First, the government should focus more on 
depoliticization rather than privatization. The cause of inefficiency in state-owned 
enterprises is more about political influence rather than ownership structure. Therefore, 
the government’s policy should have a broader array of actions including not only the 
privatization but also corporatization, competition policy, equity governance, and capital
allocation. For example, hardening the soft budget constraint of state-owned enterprises by 
cutting out subsidies and concessional credit lines would have more efficient in those which 
operate in competitive market.
Second, the government should avoid creating privatized natural monopolies. Lack of 
regulatory apparatus of private natural monopolies may cause tremendous negative effects 
on welfare. Traditional natural monopolies include electricity generation, transmission and 
distribution, water and sewer services, telephony services, natural gas distribution and so 
on. Theoretically, monopolies could price that are higher and output that is lower than the 
competitive market. Thus, significantly higher price by privatized monopolies will have a 
negative impact on those who have lower income groups. The deadweight losses due to 
monopoly pricing by privatized natural monopolies and cost of regulation and 
administration would be outweighed by the benefits of efficiency improvement [7].
Moreover, there is an empirical study [29] proposed that a comprehensive strategy of 
reforms including privatization and corporatization instead of sole privatization actions are 
most likely to improve state-owned enterprise performance across the countries.
Third, if required, fast privatization is necessary in order to gain support and avoid 
internal political conflicts. Slowing the privatization process down further facilitates the 
political debates and eventually cause it stop altogether. Also, rapid privatization gets 
political benefits and thus increases the probability of success [26].
Fourth, there are many cases that had good overall economic and financial performances of 
the entities remained in government ownership including France, Singapore, and Norway. 
The commonplace of this success is the legal independence of economic activities with no 
distinct favor, subsidy, or fiscal treatments. In other words, they take the corporate 
governance of those entities out of the politicians and treat them as straightforward private 
companies [15]. Having said that, it would be more effective if the governments take equity 
governance or corporatization actions such as shifting controls from politicians to managers
or distributing minor shares to active investors. Depoliticized corporate governance would 
increase the efficiency rather than create natural monopolies.
7 Conclusion
It is evident that Mongolia still suffers from the strong risk of a debt crisis. The probability 
of debt defaulting is increased than the last assessment in March 2015. The massive 
amounts of recent borrowings have not been effectively managed to address the future debt 
service and income sources. A sharp increase in external public debt close to 100% of GDP 
caused by lax fiscal policy and loosened debt ceilings as a result of alterations of laws. The 
external public debt position becomes more vulnerable to external shocks. The existing 
high level of external debt makes Mongolia’s macro-financial stability highly sensitive to 
exchange rate changes and BOP fluctuations.
Therefore, it is of utmost importance to take structural reform in economy. The core of the 
economic distress is related to the fiscal imbalance, thus it has to decreased gradually. In 
addition to fiscal policy, the excessive domestic debt level is likely to pose significant risk 
for the economy in upcoming four years. Therefore, decreased monetary base and domestic 
bond issuance is necessary.
Moreover, the legal definition and calculation method of debt indicators should to be 
revised. The exclusiveness of certain sectors from the net present value estimation should 
be avoided in order to monitor the comprehensiveness of debt sustainability.
From the expenditure side, the sluggishness of state-owned enterprises should be addressed 
by a comprehensive depolitization policy including privatization, corporatization, 
competition policy, equity governance, and capital allocation. The inefficiency of public 
enterprises cannot be solved only by changing ownership but also improving corporate 
governance, hardening budget constraint and increased opportunities of corporate control
transactions. Regarding privatization, the process should be rapid to avoid political fights. 
Also, it should be carefully analyzed before establishing privatized natural monopolies that 
the societal costs borne by increased regulation and higher prices versus benefits from 
decreased inefficiency.
Furthermore, the highly protectionist financial sector and underdeveloped capital market 
pull back the cost of capital in the business environment, while political instability and 
poor creditworthiness make the country’s investment climate unfavorable. Therefore, it is 
of importance to allow foreign financial companies entry to Mongolia. However, there are 
several policy actions should be taken in advance mostly related to collaboration with the 
foreign regulators in terms of supervision and information exchange. Also, the 
cherry-picking practice of foreign banks are necessary to be regulated. Finally, in order to 
facilitate foreign capital inflow, the existing withholding tax rates in the domestic tax laws 
and treaties should be reconsidered.
Appendix 1. Mongolian External Debt Sustainability Framework, Baseline Scenario 
Analyst’s estimation using the IMF template 
(in percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicate! 1)
Actual Historicale/ Standard 6/______________ Projections
2014 2015 2016
Average Deviation
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
2017-2022
Average 2027 2037
2023-203;
Average
External debt (nominal) 1/ 30.7 45.3 61.1 125.4 164.4 182.2 194.0 194.2 185.0 171.3 62.0
o f which: public and pub licly guaranteed (PPG) 30.7 45.3 61.1 125.4 164.4 182,2 194.0 194,2 1853 171.3 62.0
Change in external debt -32.4 14.6 15.8 64.3 39.0 17.8 11.8 0.1 -9.1 -4.4 -8.2
Identified net debt-creating flows 10.9 2.6 42.1 -12.4 -14.4 -20.1 -18.2 -20,0 -22.2 -25.8 -18.1
Non interest current account deficit 10.1 2.4 0.6 11.6 11.0 1.9 2.2 2.6 -2.6 2.3 1.6 1.6 0.5 -1.2
Deficit in balance of goods and services -5.4 -6.6 -8.0 -17.8 -19.4 -21.7 -22.8 -23.2 -24.8 -23.6 -16.1
Exports 44.0 35.7 34.1 61.8 65.7 70.5 72.6 74.0 74.9 74.2 50,6
Imports 38.6 29.1 26.0 44.0 463 48,8 49.7 50.7 50.1 50.6 34,6
Net current transfers (negative = inflow) -1.2 -1.5 -2.3 -2.6 1.3 -4.3 -4.6 -4.9 -5.0 -5.1 -5.2 -5.2 -3.5 -4.6
o f which: o fficia l -2.7 -2.7 -3.2 -6.0 -6.4 -6.9 -7.1 -7.3 -7.4 -7.4 -5.0
Other current account flows (negative = net inflow) 16.7 10.5 9.7 20.3 21.8 24.1 253 26.1 283 27.1 19.1
Net FDI (negative = inflow) -2.5 -2.6 38.0 -4.5 15.7 15.0 16.1 17.2 17.7 18.1 -18.3 -18.3 12.5 -16.4
Endogenous debt dynamics 2/ 3.3 2.8 4.7 4.4 3.9 -0.3 2.1 0.4 -2.3 -5.8 -5.1
Contribution from nominal interest rate 1A 1.7 2.1 4.6 4.2 4,8 4.6 4.1 33 2.5 0.7
Contribution from real GDP growth -5.1 -0.8 -0,5 -0.2 -0.3 -5.0 -2.5 -3,8 -53 -8.3 -5.7
Contribution from price and exchange rate changes 6.9 1.9 3.1
Residual (3-4) 3/ -43.3 12.0 -26.3 76.7 53.4 37.8 30.0 20.1 13.1 21.3 9.9
o f which: exceptional financing 0.0 0.0 0,0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 03 03 03
PV of external debt 4/ 57.2 129.8 129.2 139.3 145.5 142.2 1313 121.2 37.1
In percent of exports 167.9 209.9 196.6 197.6 2003 192.3 175.4 163.4 73.3
PV of PPG external debt 57.2 129.8 129.2 139.3 145.5 142.2 131.3 121.2 37.1
In percent of exports 167.9 209.9 196.6 197.6 200.6 192.3 175.4 163.4 73.3
In percent of government revenues 235.8 355.0 338.5 347.3 356.3 345.2 317.3 307.3 150.2
Debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) 3.2 4.5 6.1 26.5 29.1 14.6 12.2 21.1 28.1 8.3 11.8
PPG debt service-to-exports ratio (in percent) 3.2 4.5 6.1 26.5 29.1 14.6 12.2 21.1 28.1 8.3 11.8
PPG debt service-to-revenue ratio (in percent) 4.9 6.3 8.5 44.9 50.2 25.6 21.7 37.9 50.8 15.5 24.3
Total gross financing need (Billions o f U.S. dollars) 1.7 0.2 4,4 0.0 0.1 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 0.1 -1.2 -1.4
Non-interest current account deficit that stabilizes debt ratio 42.5 -12.3 -16,4 -66.2 -41.2 -20.3 -14.4 -2.4 73 2.8 7.7
Key macroeconomic assumptions
Real GDP growth (in percent) 7.9 2.4 1.0 7.7 5.7 0.2 0.2 3.0 1.4 23 33 1.6 53 9.0 6.7
GDP deflator in US dollar terms (change in percent) -9.9 -5.9 -6,4 6.2 20.4 -43.3 -2.4 -4.9 0.5 1.0 0.5 -8.1 0.5 1.0 0.9
Effective interest rate (percent) 5/ 2.2 5.3 4,4 1.8 2.1 43 3.3 2.8 23 2.2 18 2.8 1.5 1.0 1.4
Growth of exports of GStS (US dollar terms, in percent) 35.6 -21.9 -9,8 16.2 36.0 3 2 4.0 5.1 4.9 5.0 48 4.5 53 53 4.9
Growth of imports o f G&S (US dollar terms, in percent) -15.1 -27.5 -15.3 14.0 41.8 -4.0 3.0 3.2 3.9 5.1 23 23 5.0 5.0 5.1
Grant element o f new public sector borrowing (in percent) 323 33.0 44.0 44.0 45.1 46.4 40.9 52.6 52.6 52.1
Government revenues (excluding grants, in percent of GDP) 28.2 25.5 24.2 363 38.2 40.1 403 41.2 41.4 39.4 24.7 34.7
Aid flows (in Billions of US dollars) 7/ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
o f which: Grants 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 03 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1
o f which: Concessional loans 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 03 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of GDP) 8/ 17.1 153 9.6 9 3 8.6 78 5.0 2.1 4.1
Grant-equivalent financing (in percent of external financing) 8/ 34.1 34.3 46.4 46 2 473 48.9 55.8 55.8 55.2
Memorandum items:
Nominal GDP (Billions of US dollars) 12.2 118 11.1 63 6.2 6.1 6 2 6.4 63 8.4 20.0
Nominal dollar GDP growth -2.8 -3.6 -5.5 -43.1 -2.1 -2.0 19 3.0 3.5 -6.5 5.5 10.1 7.7
PV of PPG external debt (in Billions of US dollars) 5.6 83 8.0 8.4 93 9.0 83 10.1 7.4
(PVt-PVt- 1)/GDPt-1 (in percent) 27.0 -103 7.2 9.0 13 -63 4.5 3.9 -2.6 0.1
Gross workers' remittances (Billions of US dollars) 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
PV of PPG external debt (in percent of GDP + remittances) 56.6 1273 126.4 136.1 1423 138.7 1283 118.2 36.5
PV of PPG external debt (in percent of exports + remittances) 162.8 203.1 190.2 191.1 1943 1863 1693 158.0 70.8
Debt service of PPG external debt (in percent of exports + remittanci 5.9 25.7 28.2 14.1 113 20.4 272 8.0 11.4
Appendix 2. Sensitivity Analysis for Key Indicators of Public Debt 
Analyst’s estimation using the IMF template
(in percent )
A. Alternative Scenarios
A l. Key variables at their historical averages in 2017-2037 1/
A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2017-2037 2
B. Bound Tests
Bl. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2018-2019 
B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2018-2019 3/
B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2018-2019
B4. Net non-debt creating flow s at historical average m inus one standard deviation in 2018-2019 4/
B5, Combination o f B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks
B6, One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2018 5/
Baseline
A. Alternative Scenarios
A l. Key variables at their historical averages in 2017-21 
A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms ini
2017 2018
PV of debt-to GDP ratio
PV of debt-to-exports ratio
B. Bound Tests
Page
Bl. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2018-2019 
B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2018-2019 3/
B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average m inus one standard deviation in 2018-2019
B4. Net non-debt creating flow s at historical average m inus one standard deviation in 2018-2019 4/
B5, Combination o f B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks
B6, One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2018 5/
A. Alternative Scenarios
A l. Key variables at their historical averages in 2017-2037 1/
A2. New public sector loans on less favorable terms in 2017-2037 2
B. Bound Tests
Bl. Real GDP growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2018-2019 
B2. Export value growth at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2018-2019 3/
B3. US dollar GDP deflator at historical average minus one standard deviation in 2018-2019
B4. Net non-debt creating flow s at historical average m inus one standard deviation in 2018-2019 4/
B5, Combination o f B1-B4 using one-half standard deviation shocks
B6, One-time 30 percent nominal depreciation relative to the baseline in 2018 5/
355
355
Projections
2019 2020 2021 2022 2027 2037
130 129 139 146 142 131 121 27
130 126 132 138 138 132 144 112
130 138 154 166 167 160 163 7B
130 127 138 144 141 130 120 27
130 137 162 169 166 155 144 44
130 147 175 183 179 165 1S2 47
130 145 173 179 176 166 154 43
130 138 161 167 164 154 144 44
130 186 201 210 205 189 175 53
210 197 198 201 192 175 163 73
210
^ l 2
187 191 186 176 194 221
210 218 228 226 214 220 155
210 196 197 200 192 175 163 73
210 270 392 396 382 353 331 149
210 196 197 200 192 175 163 73
210 220 245 247 239 221 208 94
210 230 273 276 266 247 232 105
210 196 197 200 192 175 163 73
PV of debt-to-revenue ratio
355 338
331
362
329
384
339
405
334
405
319
387
364
413
452
317
355 332 344 353 342 314 305 149
355 358 405 414 403 375 366 ISO
355 384 437 448 434 399 386 139
355 379 430 439 428 401 392 192
355 363 401 409 399 373 364 179
355 488 500 513 497 457 443 216
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